james.fodor's blog

Where does morality come from?

Do moral judgments express beliefs? Those who claim it does not (non-cognitivists) can be differentiated by emotivism and norm expressivism. Those who they do include error theory (all moral beliefs are wrong), subjectivism (individual, cultural, divine command, and ideal observer), and realism (naturalism, and non-naturalism).

The following presentation to The Philosophy Forum (June 4, 2017) covers these issues.

Dealing with Disagreement

On many important issues of science, philosophy, politics, and religion, equally knowledgeable and intelligent people often disagree with
one another. In this presentation I argue that on such matters, it is not epistemically justifiable to hold firmly to the correctness of one’s opinion, defined as one’s own subjective evaluation of the evidence. Rather, I argue that one’s opinion should receive no greater weight in constituting beliefs than does the opinion of any other equally informed person. I conclude by considering some common objections to my argument.

Presentation to The Philosophy Forum, November 2015

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